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A prominent policy issue of the 1970s and one
that seems certain to dominate the early 1980s is the
appropriate response to a prevailing high rate of in-
flation. The view that there is a long-run trade-off
between inflation and unemployment, widely accepted
at the end of the sixties, is now held by only a small
minority of economists. It is still widely believed,
however, that there is a short-run trade-off between
inflation and unemployment, which implies that re-
strictive macroeconomic policies designed to reduce
inflation would cause a temporary rise in the unem-
ployment rate. Therefore, both the time pattern of the
response of inflation and unemployment to demand
management policies and the relative cost of inflation
and unemployment remain dominant issues in the
design of macroeconomic policy.
There is relatively little consensus on either the costs
or benefits of reducing inflation. Both income-expendi-
ture and monetaristmacroeconometric models indicate
that a deceleration in monetary growth would gradu-
ally eradicate inflation but at a sizable cost in terms
of foregone output. In contrast, recent theoretical anal-
ysis based on “rational expectations” suggests that the
cost of reducing inflation could be small. Moreover,
the literature contains still less information on the
cost of inflation, which makes it difficult to obtain a
careful balancing of the costs and benefits of policies
intended to reduce or eliminate inflation.
This paper develops three views of the dynamics of
inflation and unemployment: the expectations-aug-
mented Phillips Curve model, a monetarist model of
the relation of monetary change to both inflation and
unemployment, and a rational expectations model.
Based on each of these models, estimates of the cost
of reducing inflation are presented. Finally, the size
of the permanent per period gains associated with
eradicating inflation that would justify incurring these
temporary costs are estimated using both the Phillips
Curve and monetarist models.
THREE VIEWS OF THE RELATION
BETWEEN INFLATION AND
UNEMPLOYMENT
The Phillips Curve approach, as employed in
virtually all large-scale, income-expenditure macro-
econometric models, relates inflation to the unemploy-
ment rate and inflation expectations and almost uni-
formly specifies inflation expectations as dependent
exclusively on past actual inflation rates. Some mone-
tarists, however, prefer to relate both inflation and
unemployment directly to monetary change and reject
the regularity between inflation and unemployment
embodied in the Phillips Curve. A third view accepts
the Phillips Curve but introduces an alternative hy-
pothesis about expectations formation. This rational
expectations approach yields conclusions quite differ-
ent from the first two approaches.
The Phillips Curve
The Phillips Curve relates the rate of change in
nominal wages to both the unemployment rate and
the rate at which wages and/or prices are expected to
rise. This is usually combined with a mark-up model
of price determination in which prices are related to
wages. A combination of the two hypotheses yields a
relation between inflation (p), unemployment (u),
and expected inflation (p’):
(l)pu+~u+p’,~<O,
There are two basic sources of inflation identified
in equation 1: a demand factor and an expectations
factor. The unemployment rate is a proxy for the
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balance between supply and demand in the labor
market. The lower the unemployment rate, the greater
the demand relative to the supply of labor. When
there is excess demand for labor, wages are bid up
at a rate proportional to the degree of excess demand.
Workers and firms bargain directly about nominal
wages, but labor supply and demand depend on the
real wage rate.1 Hence, the bargaining for nominal
wage increases over any period will also depend on
the rate of inflation expected over that period.
According to the Phillips Curve perspective, de-
mand management policies affect inflation by affect-
ing aggregate demand and, hence, unemployment.
While in principle economic policy could affect in-
flation expectations directly, the specification of the
Phillips Curve in macroeconometric models generally
assumes that inflation expectations are formed adap-
tively, that is, they depend exclusively on past infla-
tion rates. A simple form for such an equation is:
(1’) Pt = a + IS Ut + Pt-i,
where Pt ~5the rate of inflation over some period, u~
is the average unemployment rate over the period,
and p~is last period’s inflation rate and, hence, this
period’s expected rate.
The role of lagged inflation in the Phillips Curve
may also reflect the direct influence of past wage
and price changes on current inflation due to catch-up
effects and long-term contracts. Contracts that fix
wages over some period, typically from one to three
years, permit current wage settlements to influence
wages and prices over the duration of the contract,
building an element of persistence or inertia into the
inflation process.2
In the specification given by equation 1’, there exists
a critical unemployment rate consistent with either
price stability or constant inflation.3 Setting pt = pt-i,
the critical value of u is u* = —cx/~.This is often
referred to as the natural rate of unemployment or
the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment
Figure 1
(NAIRU). Anti-inflation policy operates by raising u
above u; as long as u is greater than u°,inflation de-
celeratesand ultimately is eradicated.
Figure 1 depicts this cycling down process. First,
policy reduces aggregate demand. This raises u above
u° and induces a deceleration in inflation (link 1).
The decline in the actual inflation rate, in turn, re-
duces inflation expectations via the p~term (link 2),
which further reduces actual inflation in the next
period (link 3). As long as u remains above u*, this
cycling down continues. Ultimately, u returns to u*
when inflation has been fully eradicated. Thus, eradi-
cating inflation requires a temporary rise in the un-
employment rate during the transition to price
stability.
Monetarist Reduced-Form Equations
Stein has developed a “monetarist” framework for
assessing the relation between inflation and unemploy-
ment.4 Stein’s basic inflation equation can be expressed
as:
(2) Pt — Pt-4 = a (mt —pt-i),
where mt is the rate of monetary growth in period t.
According to this specification, inflation accelerates
when monetary growth exceeds the previous period’s
rate of inflation.
The distinctive feature of the monetarist equation
is not that it identifies monetary growth as the key
factor driving inflation while the Phillips Curve ig-
4
Jerome L. Stein, “Inflatimi, Employment and Stagflation,”
Journal of Monetary Economics (April 1978), pp. 193-228.
Similar approaches have been presented by Carlson and
Tatom: Keith M. Carlson, “Inflation, Unemployment, and
Money: Comparing the Evidence from Two Simple Models,’
this Review (September 1978), pp. 2-6; and Johsi A. Tatom,
Does the Stage of the Business Cycle Affect the Inflation
Rate?” this Review (September 1978), pp. 7-15.
1ff escalator clauses were both universal and complete, bar-
gaining would be in terms of real wages. The existence of
partial escalator clauses for some workers speeds the response
of wage to price change, hut doesn’t alter the fact that nom-
inal wage bargains must directly reflect inflation expectations
over the duration of the contract.
2
See John B. Taylor, “Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro
Model,” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings
(May 1979), pp. 108-13, for a model that incorporates both
forward-looking and backward-looking elements in the wage
setting decisions.
3
The existence of an equilibrium or natural rate of unemploy-
ment independent of the rate of inflation depends on the co-
efficient of inflation expectations in equation 1 or lagged in-
flation in 1’ being equal to unity.
4
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nores the influence of monetary change on inflation.
The Phillips Curve itself is consistent with monetary
change as a dominant influence on the inflation rate.
However, it is a specification of the structure of the
inflation process, that is, how monetary change affects
inflation. According to the Phillips Curve interpreta-
tion, a decline in monetary growth moderates inflation
by temporarily raising unemployment. The monetarist
equation, in contrast, directly relates monetary growth
to inflation and is essentially a reduced-form equation
relating inflation to policy instruments. In contrast to
the Phillips Curve, however, equation 2 allows only
monetary change to affect inflation. It also appears to
make the acceleration of inflation independent of de-
mand conditions in the economy. In fact, however,
the unemployment rate itself is also affected by mone-
tary growth in the Stein model.5 Hence, in both the
Phillips Curve and monetarist frameworks, a decline
in monetary growth both increases unemployment and
reduces inflation. Both approaches therefore permit us
to calculate the temporary rise in unemployment asso-
ciated with anti-inflation policy.6
Equilibrium Models and
Rational Expectations
Recently there has been renewed interest in equi-
librium models in which monetary change results in an
immediate proportional change in the price level.~
A useful point of departure here is a simple inflation
reduced-form equation in which the inflation rate
equals the rate of monetary growth:
(3) pzm.
This differs from traditional monetarist models in
allowing the full effect of monetary change on prices
to occur immediately. The Phillips Curve then deter-
mines the unemployment rate. It is convenient to
rearrange equation 1 as:
(4) u = u* + i/IS (p - p’),
which demonstrates that unemployment deviates from
5
Stein’s unemployment rate equation is presented later when
his model is used to derive the response of inflation and un-
employment to monetary change.
°Note, however, that inflation is expected to fall as long as
u > u
4
according to the Phillips Cnrve; in the monetarist
model, on the other hand, an acceleration in monetary growth
induces an acceleration in inflation even if the unemployment
rate initially is above its critical u° level. Despite this dif-
ference, the two approaches yield similar implications for the
time path of unemployment and inflation in response to a
deceleration in monetary growth.
T
For example, see Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace, “Ra-
tional Expectations and the Theory of Economic Policy,”
Journal of Monetary Economics (April 1976), pp. 169-85. The
model developed below is similar to the one developed by
Sargent and Wallace.
its natural rate only in response to unanticipated in-
flation.
Monetary change determines the actual inflation
rate (via equation 3). Inflation expectations, accord-
ing to the rational expectations view, are formed on
the basis of the relevant economic theory — in this
case on the relevant model of the inflation process —
and are conditional on all relevant available informa-
tion. Taking the expected value of inflation from
equation 3,
(5) p’ = E(p) =
where E ( m) is the expected rate of monetary growth
conditional on information available prior to the
period over which the expectations apply, equation 4
can be rewritten as:
(4’) u = u° + 1/~(m — E(m)).
This implies that unemployment is affected only by
unanticipated monetary change.
In the previous two models, a deceleration in mone-
tary growth reduces the growth in nominal demand,
but inflation unwinds gradually; the decline in the
growth of nominal demand, therefore, initially falls
heavily on real demand and, hence, initially reduces
output and employment. In this model, in contrast,
monetary deceleration increases unemployment only if
the monetary deceleration is unexpected. If it is an-
nounced in advance and reflected in expectations,
a rapid deceleration of inflation results with no tem-
porary rise in unemployment and, hence, no cumu-
lative output loss.
However, a question remains: How rapidly would
the expected rate of monetary growth decelerate even
if the Fed announced a policy of phased deceleration?
Barro’s attempt to implement this model empirically
holds that economic agents base their expecta-
tions of monetary growth in part on past monetary
growth.8 In a sense, such a specification substitutes
past actual rates of monetary growth for past actual
inflation rates and, therefore, does not entirely re-
move the inflation inertia embedded in the traditional
Phillips Curve. Meltzer also has recently emphasized
the gradual process whereby expectations of future
monetary growth respond to current observations of
monetary policy actionsY The overall framework,
5
llobert J. Barro, “Unanticipated Money Growth and Unem-
ployment in the United States,” American Economic Review
(March 1977), pp. 101-15.
0
Allan Ft. Meltzer “The Case for Gradualism in Policies to
Reduce Inflation,’ Stabilization Policies: Lessons from the
I970s and Implications for the I980s (St. Louis: Washington
University, Center for the Study of American Business),
forthcoming.
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however, suggests that the Fed can minimize the
cumulative output loss by carrying out its anti-infla-
tion policy in a manner that makes it easy for the
public to discern its intent; this means developing
a reputation for meeting its monetary aggregate tar-
gets and reducing the volatility of monetary growth
so it is easy to recognize changes in the target rate
when they occur.
THE RESPONSE OF INFLATION AND
OUTPUT TO ANTI-INFLATION POLICY
Results Based on Estimated Phillips Curves
When developing an estimate of the cost of anti-
inflation policy using a Phillips Curve, anti-inflation
“policy” is identified with an increase in the unem-
ployment rate above the critical rate. Underlying the
change in the unemployment rate, but implicit in the
analysis, are changes in monetary and fiscal policy
instruments, As long as the unemployment rate is
maintained above the critical rate, inflation will de-
celerate. Based on the assumed initial inflation rate
and on the estimated parameters in the Phillips Curve,
it is simple to calculate how long it will take to eracli-
cate inflation.
The final step in estimating the cost of an anti-infla-
tion policy is to convert the increased unemployment












is done via Okun’s Law: Each 1 percentage point
increase in the unemployment rate reduces real out-
put by 3.2 percent.1° Thus, at the 1978 value for
potential output, for example, a 1 percentage-point
rise in unemployment translates into a 45.6 billion
dollar loss in output. The cumulative but undis-
counted loss can be found by assuming that potential
output will rise at a 3.3 percent rate in line with pro-





y = the Okun coefficient,
= the level of unemployment brought on by policy,
u* = the critical unemployment rate,
p = the rate of growth of potential output, and
n = the number of years required to eradicate
inflation.
lOArthur M. Okun, “Potential GNP: Its Measurement and Sig-
nificance,” from Proceedings of the Business and Economics
Statistics Section of the American Statistical Association
(1962), pp. 98-104. More recent estimates of Okun’s Law
suggest that the output loss might be only 2.5 percent for
each 1 percent increase in unemployment. See, for example,
the estimates in the St. Louis model in Leonall C. Andersen
and Keith M. Carlson, “A Monetarist Model for Economic
Stabilization,” this Review (April 1970), pp. 7-25, and
Tatom’s discussion of Okun’s Law in “Does the Stage of
the Business Cycle?”
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The discounted output loss is simply the product of
the initial year’s loss and the number of years required
to complete the program.”
The estimate of the cumulative output loss based
on a Phillips Curve equation presented in this section
is derived from the results of a study by Perry.’2
Perry’s results are based on a wage change equation,
using the inverse of his weighted unemployment rate
and lagged wage change, estimated using annual ob-
servations over the 1954-77 period:
(7) Mn W = —1.88 + 7.44 (1/Uw) + 0.79 A mW-s +
(—2.2) (3.5) (4.6)
0.21 Mn Wa + 1.07 DNIX SE = 0.70,
(1.1) (2.9)
where W is adjusted hourly earnings in the private
nonfann sector and DNIX is a dummy for the con-
trols equal to —1 in 1972 and 1973 and +1 in 1974
and 1975. His preferred equation yielded a NAIIIU of
4.0 in terms of his weighted unemployment rate
(which corresponds to about 5.5 percent in the of-
ficial unemployment rate in 1977). Hence, any
“This is the same as discounting future years’ losses by a 3.3
percent real interest rate.
“George L. Perry, “Slowing the Wage Price Spiral: The Macro-
economic View,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activit
(2: 1978), pp. 259-91. Similar estimates have been presente
by Okun and Gramlich. Arthur M. Okun, “Eflicient Disinfla-
tionary Policies,” American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings (May 1978), pp. 348-52; and Edward M. Gram-
lich, “Macrn Policy Responses to Price Shocks,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity (1: 1979), pp. 125-86.
employment rate above 5.5 percent, if maintained
long enough, would eradicate inflation.
In the following simulations, inflation is assumed
initially to be 7.5 percent, and the economy is as-
sumed initially to be at the critical unemployment rate
(NAIRU). The time it would take to eliminate infla-
tion if unemployment were raised by either 1 or 3
percentage points is then calcnlated.
The response of inflation to a rise in the unemploy-
ment rate and the accompanying cumulative output
loss are depicted in charts 1 and 2: Perry 1 cor-
responds to a 1 percentage point rise in the unem-
ployment rate and Perry 2 to a 3 percentage-point rise.
Beginning with Ala W (approximately the percentage
change in the wage rate) equal to 10 percent, the
unemployment rate is raised above NAIRU and held
there until the rate of wage change declines to 2.5
percent, the rate presumed consistent with the trend
growth in labor productivity and, hence, with price
stability. When unemployment is raised 1 percentage
point, the rate of change in the wage rate falls from
10 percent to 9.6 percent in the first year and declines
about 0.3 percentage points per year thereafter, taking
23 years to reach the 2.5 percent rate consistent with
zero price inflation. The undiscounted cumulative out-
put loss is $1.5 trillion, and the discountcd cumulative
output loss is $1 trillion.
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Chart 3
Moderation in Inflation: St. Louis and Stein Models
If unemployment is raised by 3 percentage points,
inflation is eliminated after 11 years. The cumulative
output loss, however, is greater in this case: $1.8 tril-
lion in the undiscounted case and $1.5 trillion in the
discounted case.’8
Results Based on a Monetarist Model
According to Stein’s monetarist model, monetary
change affects both inflation and unemployment.
Stein’s two-equation model is:
(8) Ant = 3.0 —0.6 u’-
1
+ 0.4 p,-, —0.4 mt.
4
(9) Ap~= — 0.4 Pt-, + 0.4 mt,.
If monetary growth remains constant, inflation con-
verges to the rate of monetary growth, and unemploy-
ment converges to a constant rate, equal to 5 percent
in Stein’s model. Hence, the equilibrium rate of in-
flation equals the rate of monetary growth, and the
critical unemployment rate is 5 percent. If monetary
growth declines below the rate of inflation, inflation
‘
3
While most reported Phillips Curves yield high estimates
of cumulative output loss in line with Perry’s, there are
some that imply much lower estimates. For example, see
the Phillips Curve presented by Phillip Cagan in “The Re-
duction of Inflation by Slack Demand,” in William Fellner,
Project Director, Contemporary Economic Problems in 1978
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1978), pp. 13-45. The cumulative output
loss based on Cagan’s equation is only about one quarter of
that implied by Perry’s equation.
decelerates and unemployment temporarily rises
its equilibrium rate.
above
The simulation used to derive an estimate of the
cumulative output loss from Stein’s model differs from
that usedin thePhillips Curve approach. Since inflation
and unemployment are both linked directly to mone-
tary change in the monetarist model, the rate of mone-
tary growth can be used as the policy instrument. As-
sume that the rates of monetary growth and inflation
are both 7.5 percent initially and that the economy is
at the equilibrium unemployment rate. Anti-inflation
policy is identified with a deceleration in the rate of
monetary expansion. Now, consider two scenarios: a
phased deceleration of monetary growth by 1 percent-
age point per year until the rate of monetary growth
declines to a rate which, if maintained, would be con-
sistent with price stability (zero in this model) and an
immediate deceleration to the rate consistent with
long-run price stability. Imposing these alternative
paths of monetary change on the model generates the
associated implied paths of inflation and imemploy-
ment; the rise in unemployment above 5 percent is
then translated into a measure of the cumulative out-
put loss.
The effects of each policy on inflation and output
loss are depicted in charts 3 and 4; the Stein 1 lines
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chert 4
Cumulative Output Loss: St. Louis and Stein Models
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growth, the Stein 2 lines represent the more aggres-
sive policy. Under the gradual policy, unemployment
begins to rise in year 2, peaks in year 8 at 6.6 per-
cent, and returns to almost 5 percent by year 16. The
inflation rate, on the other hand, begins to decelerate
in year 2, initially at a 0.4 percentage point a year
rate, ultimately reaching 1.0 point per year by year
7. The inflation rate is down to 2 percent by year 8
and thereafter declines gradually to about zero by
year 16. The undiscounted cumulative output loss is
$687.5 billion. Interestingly, the more aggressive pol-
i~’incurs a smaller undiscounted output loss, $813
billion.
Note that, qualitatively, the results are similar to
those based on the Phillips Curve: Restrictive demand
management policy temporarily will raise unemploy-
ment as it induces deceleration in the rate of inflation.
The size of the cumulative output loss in the Stein
model, however, is dramatically lower than that based
on Perry’s equation.
Results Using the St. Louis Model
The St. Louis model is in some sense a compromise
between the Phiffips Curve and the monetarist re-
duced-form approaches developed above.14 The two
‘~TheSt. Louis model is described in Andersen and Carlson,
“A Monetarist Model.”
key equations in the St. Louis model are
a reduced-form equation for the rate of
growth in nominal income based on the
Andersen-Jordan equation and an expecta-
tions-augmented Phillips Curve.’5 The rate
of monetary change is the principal de-
terminant of the rate of change in nominal
income, although the rate of change in
high-employment government expenditures
also has a small, transitory effect. Thus, a
decline in the rate of monetary growth is
quickly translated into a decline in the rate
of increase in nominal income. The distri-
bution of the latter decline between prices
and output depends on the Phillips Curve;
the slower the deceleration of inflation as
nominal income falls, the greater the fin-
pact of monetary change on output and the
greater the resulting cumulative output loss
of anti-inflation policy.
To begin, a base run in which the rate
of monetary growth is held steady at 7.5
percent from 111/1968 through IV/l978
was generated. This builds in inflation in-
ertia and provides the base against which to evaluate
the effects of gradual monetary deceleration. Begin-
ning in 1/1973, monetary growth was gradually decel-
erated by 1 percentage point in the first quarter of
each year. The results from this policy run were then
compared with those from the base run and the cumu-
lative output loss associated with this policy was
derived by comparing the output solution assuming
monetary growth remains at 7.5 perceott per year with
that assuming a phased monetary deceleration.’6
The first set of simulations was generated using the
St. Louis model estimated over the sample period
I/1953-IV/1978. The results, labeled StLl, are re-
ported in charts 3 and 4. The inflation rate begins to
decline slowly; indeed, it takes 2 years to reduce it
by 1 percentage point. Thereafter, the deceleration
speeds up; after 5½ years, inflation has declined by
7.5 percentage points. The unemployment rate initially
rises slowly, and the maximum increase is only 1.8
‘
5
Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan, “Monetary and Fis-
cal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Importance in Eco-
nomic Stabilization,” this Review (November 1968), pp.
11-24.
~°Because the model produces direct solutions for the response
of output to monetary deceleration, the use of Okun’s Law
is not required.
Veer
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percentage points. The undiscounted cumulative out-
put loss is only about $200 billion.17
The estimate of the cumulative output loss in this
case is dramatically lower than for either the Stein
model or the Perry equation. However, the small size
of the cumulative output loss reflects, in part, the
suspiciously large coefficient on the demand slack
variable in the model’s Phillips Curve — almost three
times the size of the same coefficient estimated
through 11/1971. or 1/1975, for example. This rise in
the demand slack coefficient is neither readily ex-
plained nor mirrored in other estimates of Phillips
Curves. Consequently, two additional runs with moth-
fled versions of the St. Louis model were made.
First, a simulation of the model estimated through
111/1971 in which the coefficient on the demand slack
variable is substantially smaller was run, The results
are depicted by the StL2 lines in charts 3 and 4. In-
flation decelerates much more gradually; after six
years, it has declined by only 4 percentage points.
The cumulative output loss, already at $350 billion,
is escalating rapidly.
In the second modified version of the St. Louis
model, the Phillips Curve was replaced with a mone-
tarist reduced form for the inflation rate in which in-
flation depends on a 20-period distributed lag on the
rate of change in the money supply.18 The lines la-
beled StL3 in charts 3 and 4 present the implications
of gradual monetary deceleration on inflation and out-
put in this case. The results are remarkably similar to
those generated by the first modified version of the
St. Louis model (StL2 lines in charts 3 and 4). The
inflation rate declines somewhat more rapidly and
the output loss is a bit smaller, but both the time
pattern and magnitude of inflation deceleration and
output loss are very close.
The StL2 and StL3 simulations were not run long
enough to eradicate inflation and, therefore, are not
directly comparable with the Phillips Curve and mone-
tarist reduced-form results. Nonetheless, the results
FEBRUARY 1980
at the end of six years were qualitatively similar
to the Perry and Stein results: Anti-inflation policies
impose a sizable cost in the form of lost output dur-
ing the transition to lower inflation rates.’9
The Credibility Effect and
Rational Expectations
The Phillips Curve-based results reported above re-
lated inflation to a distributed lag of past inflation
rates, which implies a gradual unwinding of inflation
in response to anti-inflation policies. In this specifica-
tion, inflation expectations are formed exclusively on
the basis of past actual inflation. This ignores the pos-
sibility that the public will adjust their inflation ex-
pectations to both recent policy actions and expecta-
tions about future policy. A well-defined, credible
anti-inflation policy might induce a more rapid decel-
eration of inflation expectations than is suggested by
the conventional equations. Fellner, for example,
maintains that “. ..the standard model coefficients
-..would change significantly for the better — in the
direction of a much more rapid rate of reduction of
inflation for any given slack — if a demand manage-
ment policy ...changed to a credible policy of con-
sistent demand disinflation.”20
But, by how much do standard econometric ap-
proaches overestimate inflation inertia and the associ-
ated cumulative output loss? Unfortunately, reliable
quantitative estimates of the extent to which policy-
makers can speed the deceleration of inflation by
clearly defining their anti-inflation policies and con-
vincing the public that they intend to follow through
do not exist. Nevertheless, there is widespread agree-
ment that anti-inflation policies ought to be set out
clearly and supported by both the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury to maximize credibility.
There are, however, two empirical applications of
rational expectations macro models that provide some
insight into the predictions of that approach for the
response to a phased monetary deceleration. Paul A.
1T
Jn the Perry and Stein results, the initial level of potential
output was that for 1978. The $200 billion cost estimate for
the St. Louis model is based on an initial level of income in
1973. To make the St. Louis result comparable with the
Perry and Stein results, it would be appropriate to multiply
it by a factor equal to the ratio of potential output in 1978
to that in 1973.
1t
The inflation reduced form was provided by Tatom and is
similar to the one he presented in”Does the Stage of the
Business Cycle?” In addition to the distributed lag on mone-
tary change, it also includes a four-quarter distributed lag on
the differential in the rates of change in producer prices for
energy and the price index for the nonfann business sector,
as well as two dummies, one for the effects of the freeze
and Phase II and one for the subsequent catch-up effect.
lODewald recently presented simulations of the response of in-
flation, output, and unemployment to monetary deceleration
based on a modified version of the St. Louis model. William
G. Dewald, “Fast vs. Gradual Policies for Controlling Infla-
tion,” Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Economic Re-
view (January 1980), pp. 16-25. He estimates the Phillips
Curve in the rate of change as opposed to the first difference
form used in the St. Louis model, This procedure does not
yield a coefficient on the demand slack variable as high as
in the St. Louis specification. Hence, Dewald also finds that
monetary deceleration yields a large cumulative output loss.
20
William Fellner, “The Credibility Effect and Rational Ex-
pectations: Implications of the Gramlich Study,” Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity (1: 1979), pp. 167-78.
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Anderson modifies the St. Louis model by respecifying
its Phillips Curve to be consistent with rational expec-
tations.21 He begins with a Phillips Curve of the fol-
lowing form:
(10) p = a + ~y+ ep’ + C,
where x is a measure of demand slack in the economy,
and S is a random disturbance term with mean zero.
Instead of specifying pB as a distributed lag on past
actual inflation rates as in the equation in the St. Louis
model, Anderson imposes rational expectations by set-
ting p equal to the expected value of inflation based
on equation 10. Setting pe = E(p), he solves for the
expected value of inflation:
(10’) E(p) = -~-~--+ -y~-~- x.
Anderson uses this equation to determine the infla-
tion rate in the St. Louis model, based on the estimates
of a, I~, and e from the St. Louis Phillips Curve. In
particular he sets e = .86. This procedure, in effect,
dramatically raises the response of inflation to changes
in demand slack. He runs simulations of the response
to an acceleration in the rate of monetary growth. In
the original St. Louis version, inflation increases grad-
ually and unemployment declines; in the rational ex-
pectations version, inflation increases more rapidly
and the effect on unemployment virtually disappears.
If ei sviewed as the coefficient on expected infla-
tion, however, it seems inappropriate to employ its
value of .88 as estimated in the St. Louis model in
the rational expectations version of the St. Louis model
because it was estimated originally under the assump-
tion that expectations are formed adaptively. Taking
e = 1, as seems essential to the rational expectations
framework, equation 10’ is no longer a meaningful
equation for p. Instead, setting p’ = E(p) and solv-
ing for E(p), we obtain:
(10”) 0 = cx + ~y,
which indicates that there is a unique value of the
demand slack variable (x = —a/j3), corresponding,
of course, to the natural rate of unemployment. Only
random disturbances (with zero mean) can cause x
to differ fromx°In this case, the impact of monetary
deceleration on the rate of growth of nominal income
is transformed immediately and fully into a decline
in inflation without any cumulative output loss.
An alternative empirical application of a rational
expectations macro model is presented by Barro.22 He
2lPaul A. Anderson, “Rational Expectations Forecasts from







Barro, “Unanticipated Money Growth.”
relates deviations in unemployment from its natural
rate to unanticipated monetary change (as in equation
4’ above) and, in addition, provides a model describ-
ing how economic agents form expectations about the
rate of monetary growth. On the surface at least,
Barro’s model seems well suited to provide an estimate
of unemployment’s response to a policy of phased
deceleration in monetary growth. The crucial issue
here is how rapidly economic agents learn that the
policy rule has in fact changed. They may learn this
from an announcement by the Fed. Given some doubt
about the Fed’s commitment to follow through on any
announced deceleration, however, economic agents
may insist on learning the new policy rule by observ-
ing the new pattern of monetary growth rates. This
involves reestimating the policy rule and incorporat-
ing new observations each period. Eventually, eco-
nomic agents will learn that the Fed intends to
decelerate monetary growth and then stabilize it at
a noninflationary rate, But this learning process may
take some time; meanwhile, monetary change will be
less than expected and unemployment will exceed
the natural rate. Hence, the Barro model also allows
for the existence of a cumulative output loss during
the transition to price level stability.23
The survey above provides the following cost esti-
mates: the extremely large estimate of the cumulative
output loss based on Perry’s Phillips Curve, the smaller
but still sizable loss based on Stein’s monetarist
model, the evidence from simulations with the St.
Louis model which, on balance, also suggest a large
output loss, and the rational expectations results as
modeled by Anderson, which suggest virtually no out-
put loss if monetary deceleration is perfectly antici-
pated. Unfortunately, in addition to the uncertainty
surrounding the actual cumulative output loss likely
to be associated with anti-inflation policy, there is




The cumulative output loss is a measure of the costs
of anti-inflation policies. To evaluate the desirability
of such policies, an assessment of the gains from re-
ducing inflation is required. Unfortunately, the costs of
23
TWs is an application of the learning mechanism emphasized
by JoIm B. Taylor, “Monetary Policy During a Transition to
Rational Expectations,” Journal of Political Economy (Oc-
tober 1975), pp. 1009-21; and by Benjamin M. Friedman,
“Optimal Expectations and the Extreme Information Assump-
tions of ‘Rational Expectations’ Macromodels,” Journal of
Monetary Economics (January 1979), pp. 23-41.
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inflation (and hence the benefits of reducing inflation)
are not as clear cut or easily quantifiable as the costs
of unemployment. Currently, no studies provide esti-
mates of the benefits that would accrue from reduc-
ing or eliminating inflation, which could in turn be
compared directly to the cumulative output loss re-
quired to eradicate inflation. What can be computed,
however, is the minimum size of the permanent gain
in output per year due to the eradication of inflation
that would justify incurring the cumulative output
loss associated with the transition to price stability.
The Costs of Inflation
There are at least three dimensions to the costs of
inflation.24 First, there are the costs associated with
anticipated inflation that would be incurred even in
a fully indexed economy where institutions have com-
pletely adapted to an inflationary environment. Second,
there are the costs of anticipated inflation that arise
from a set of institutions that have only partially
adapted to the inflationary environment. Third, there
are the costs associated with unanticipated inflation
and uncertainty about the rate of inflation.
A fully indexed economy is one in which all nominal
payments and receipts (including wages, coupon pay-
ments, taxes, transfers, etc.) are tied (indexed) to the
inflation rate. All debt instruments except for currency
are indexed also. Currency is not indexed because in-
dexing it is assumed to be impractical.
The major costs of anticipated inflation in a fully
indexed economy can be labeled “menu” and “shoe
leather” costs. Menu costs refer to the resource costs
imposed by the necessity of frequent adjustments to
published price lists in an inflationary economy. Shoe
leather costs describe the costs incurred by more fre-
quent trips to the bank (or to the market) as a result
of the incentive to economize on currency holdings25
Recently there has been a growing emphasis on the
costs imposed by inflation that reflect the existence
of institutions that are not fully adapted to an infla-
tionary environment. The major source of these costs
is the tax system, and the major effect is on saving
and investment incentives and, therefore, on capital
accumulation and the growth of output. The taxation
24
The discussion of the costs of inflation in this section draws
upon the recent survey by Stanley Fischer and Franco
Modigliani, “Towards an Understanding of the Real Effects
and Costs of Inflation,” Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv (4:
1978), pp. 810-33.
25
For a discussion of the welfare cost of anticipated inflation,
see John A. Tatom, “The Welfare Cost of Inflation,” this
Review (November 1976), pp. 9-22.
FEBRUARY 1980
of personal interest income, for example, may induce
a decline in the after-tax real rate of return to savers
as inflation increases.28 Furthermore, the tying of the
depreciation deduction for tax purposes to the histor-
ical rather than the replacement cost of capital goods
tends to raise the cost of using capital goods in an
inflationary environment. While inflation has many
other effects on saving and investment, there is grow-
ing concern that its net effect is to discourage both
saving and investment.
Unanticipated inflation imposes costs by inducing
redistributions of income and wealth. These “transfer
effects” arise because contracts have been written iri
nominal terms embodying expectations about future
inflation which turn out to be incorrect. The social
cost of such redistributions is difficult to assess because
there is a gainer for every loser. However, many con-
sider the “transfer” costs associated with unanticipated
inflation the most serious cost associated with
inflation.27
Uncertainty about the inflation rate may impose ad-
ditional costs by increasing the uncertainty associated
with the outcome of economic decisions. Above, a cost
was ascribed to the actual redistributions that follow
from unanticipated inflation. There may also be utility
losses associated with the increased likelihood of such
arbitrary transfers when there is considerable uncer-
tainty about expected inflation. A number of studies
have suggested that inflation uncertainty tends to be
systematically related to the level of inflation, If this
is the case, reducing the level of inflation will also re-
duce inflation uncertainty.28
Fischer and Modigliani do not provide estimates for
the various effects of inflation since “any measures
28
For a discussion of the effect of taxation of interest income
on the response of nominal interest rates to a change in
expected inflation, see Martin Feldstein, “Inflation, Income
Taxes, and the Rate of Interest: A Theoretical Analysis,
American Economic Review (December 1976), pp. 809-20.
27
Franco Modigliani and Lucas Papademos, “Optimal De-
mand Policies Against Stagflation,” Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv (4: 1978), pp. 736-82.
28
5ee for example, Arthur M. Okun, “The Mirage of Steady
Inflation,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2:1971),
pp. 485-98; and Dennis E. Logue and Thomas D. Willett,
“A Note on the Relation Between the Rate and Variability
of Inflation,” Economica (May 1976), pp. 151-58. Tbese
studies generally associate an increase in inflation uncertainty
directly with an increase in the welfare cost of inflation. This
follows only if increased uncertainty about inflation increases
uncertainty about real income, real wealth, etc. For a dis-
cussion of the relation of inflation uncertainty to the welfare
cost of inflation, see Lionel Kalish III, Laurence H. Meyer,
and David H. Resler, “Inflation Uncertainty and the Welfare
Cost of Inflation,” mimeographed (Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, 1980).
12FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS FEBRUARY 1980
Output
F~~,re 2
would be totally speculative at this stage.”2° In the
absence of a measure of these costs, however, it is
possible to compute the minimum total costs associ-
ated with continued inflation necessary to justify in-
curring the previously calculated costs of eradicating
inflation.30
Evaluating the Minimum Gain Per Year
Required to Justify Policies to
Eradicate Inflation
The solid line (X) in figure 2 is the rate of growth
of potential output if inflation remains indefinitely at
7.5 percent. If anti-inflation policies are pursued, out-
put is assumed to follow the dashed line (X’). The
transitional costs of eradicating inflation occur be-
tween t~,and tn as unemployment rises above the rate
associated with potential output.
The cost of inflation may involve decreases in po-
tential output due to disincentives to saving and/or
investment and/or welfare losses due to anticipated
or unanticipated inflation. The benefit of eradicating
inflation is shown in figure 2 as an increase in output
above the level that would have prevailed had infla-
tion continued to average 7.5 percent; hence, the
29
Fischer and Modigliani, “Towards an Understanding of the
Real Effects and Costs of Inflation,” p. 813.
30
This approach was suggested to us by Jerry Jordan and
Allan Meltzer.
Table 1
The Minimum Value of the
Per Year Gain (g) That Justifies
Eradicating Inflation (billions of
1972 dollars)
Equation/





dashed X’ line rises above the solid X line after tn.
31
This analysis emphasizes the necessity of comparing
the transitional cost incurred over the period during
which inflation is eradicated with the permanent bene-
fit attributable to the eradication of inflation.
o is the present value of the permanent per period




To simplify further, gt is assumed to be constant for
all t ~n .The value of g, which equates the dis-
counted cost of unemployment and the gain from
eradicating inflation is then calculated, This is the
minimum value of the permanent per period gain from
eradicating inflation that would justify incurring the
transitional costs. The values of g, based on transi-
tional costs estimated from the Perry equation and
Stein model and calculated under the assumption of
a 3.3 percent discount rate, are presented in table 1.
The minimum value of g varies from about $25 billion
per year in the Stein model to $73 billion based on
Perry’s Phillips Curve under a moderate policy.
This analysis provides an alternative perspective
on the case for gradualism. A gradual policy will im-
pose a lower cost of eradicating inflation if the Phil-
lips Curve is nonlinear. For Perry’s nonlinear Phillips
Curve, for example, the discounted cost was $1.0 bil-
lion for the gradual policy and $1.5 billion for the
SiThe gains of reducing inflation should begin being regis-
tered during the transition period. To simplify the calcula-
tion, the benefits are assumed to begin only at ta, when infla-
tion is eradicated, This assumption biases the calculation of
the present value ofbenefits downward.
to I’me
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more aggressive policy. A more gradual policy, how-
ever, also postpones the benefits from eliminating in-
flation. The size of the permanent per period gain
required to justify the anti-inflation policy may there-
fore be smaller under the more aggressive policy. In-
deed, this is the case for the Perry results. ~klthough
the cumulative output loss is smaller under the grad-
ual policy (Perry 1), the size of the per period gain
required to justify eradicating inflation is smaller
under the more aggressive policy (Perry 2). The more
aggressive policy also yields a smaller minimum per
period gain using the Stein model, although this was
expected since the cost turned out to be lower in the
radical case using Stein’s model.
The calculations reported above presumed that the
gains from reducing inflation could be meaningfully
represented as a fixed real sum per period. Suppose,
instead, that the gains are more meaningfully specified
as a real sum which grows at the same rate as poten-
tial output. For example, the cost of a fully anticipated
increase in inflation is generally measured by the re-
duction in the area under the demand curve for real
money balances as wealthowners reduce their demand
for money in response to the associated rise in nomi-
nal interest rates. The decline in demand for real
money due to a rise in the interest rate is generally
considered proportional to the overall scale of money
holdings which, in turn, is determined by the level
of transactions (e.g., real income). The cost of a given
rate of inflation and, hence, the benefits of eliminating
inflation may, therefore, grow at the rate of increase
of potential output. In this case:
(lr)G= Z
tn (1+r)
where gi sthe value of the gain in period n (the first
period in which a gain is registered). For p r, 0
—> cc. This corresponds to the result recently derived
by Feldstein: If the cost of inflation grows at a rate
equal to or greater than the discount rate, any positive
initialgain (any g > 0) is sufficient to justify incurring
any finite transitional cost!32
CONCLUSION
The existence of large transitional costs of eradicat-
ing inflation is not a sufficient reason to reject anti-
inflation policies. The potential existence of large
benefits associated with reducing inflation requires
a careful assessment of the net effects of anti-inflation
policies. Unfortunately, the range of the estimates of
the cumulative output loss, the uncertainty about the
adjustment in those results required to allow for the
credibility effect, and the lack of quantitative esti-
mates of the cost of inflation make it extremely diffi-
cult to obtain a meaningful comparison of the costs
and benefits of an anti-inflation policy. Narrowing the
range of estimates of output loss and developing a
measure of the benefits associated with anti-inflation
policies should be high on the priorities for macro-
economic research in the 1980s.
2
Martin S. Feldstein, “The Welfare Cost of Permanent Infla-
tion and Optimal Short-Run Economic Policy,” Journal of
Political Economy (August 1979), pp. 749-67.
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